According to section 112(1)(b), the response of the accused to the court's questioning to test their guilty validity does not constitute evidence for the purpose of section 157(1). In case one accused has pleaded guilty and the other one not guilty, there has to be a separation of trial, and the trial for the person who pleaded guilty has to be completed first. If the accused who pleaded guilty is in agreement with the prosecution in the merits of the case and is convicted, they can be a witness for either the prosecution or the defense in the trial of the person who pleaded not guilty. In Zonele (1959 (3) SA 319 (A)), it was confirmed that if there is a joint trial where A pleads guilty but B does not and B needs A as a defense witness, their trial should be separated. A cannot be compelled to testify even though he is a co-accused. In Witbooi 1994(1) SACR 44(Ck), A pleaded guilty, and his co-accused B and C pleaded not guilty. The court questioned A in terms of 112(1) b, and his response incriminated B and C. A was convicted, and a joint trial proceeded, which resulted in the conviction of both B and C. On review, it was found that no separation caused prejudice to B and C.

Question 2

When the court is unsatisfied, it informs the party of the sentence it considers fair. A trial court cannot impose a sentence contrary to the one contained in the plea agreement without advising the state and the accused that they reached an opinion that the proposed sentence is unjust as contemplated in section 105A (9) of the Act. In Jansen v The State (1) SACR 377 (SCA), two possibilities arise, the prosecutor and the accused may elect to abide by the agreement on the merits, and the court then convicts the accused and proceeds to consider the sentence in the normal way. The other possibility is that the parties may opt to withdraw from the agreement, meaning the trial has to start de novo before another judicial officer. When a trial starts de novo, section 105A dictates that the agreement is pro-non-script, which means that no preceding negotiations on the agreement itself may be made. However, the accused may consent to all or certain admissions made by him or her either in the agreement or in the course of the proceedings. The parties cannot plea bargain in terms of section 105A concerning the charge arising from the same facts.

Question 3

Regarding the documents addressed to Solomon's attorney, they are not admissible in court. The Criminal Procedure Act only confers the power to search to find a person or to seize articles falling into one of three classes of articles. These articles include those concerned with or reasonably believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offense, those that may provide evidence of an offense, or those intended or reasonably believed to be intended to be used in the commission of an offense (section 20(a), (b), and (c)). The exception relating to privileged documents, such as communications between an attorney and their client, cannot be handed in court without the consent of the client as it is subject to legal professional privilege. In Sasol III (Edms) Bpk v Minister van Wet Orde (1991(3) SA 766 (T)), it was stated that a privileged document cannot be seized.

Question 4

4.1 According to Section 60(9), before deciding to continue incarceration, the court must weigh the likely harm against the accused’s deprivation of liberty. Other factors, such as the likelihood of the accused absconding and the ease with which stringent bail conditions can be evaded, must also be considered. The continued incarceration of the accused would be prejudicial and should only be considered if it outweighs the other factors.

4.2 Section 59(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act allows an accused, who is in custody due to offenses other than those in Part II or Part II of Schedule 2, to be released on bail. However, the offenses listed in Part II include serious crimes such as murder, rape, or human trafficking, and accused in those cases cannot be released on bail before their first appearance in court. Samuel's attempt to apply for police bail for Michelle's offense is unlikely to succeed since it is one of those serious crimes.

4.3 The cancellation of bail and imprisonment until the conclusion of relevant criminal proceedings is necessary if the accused imposes a threat, defeats the ends of justice, or poses a threat to the safety of the public or a particular person. Michelle's representative must prove that Michelle is not a danger to others, that she will attend all court hearings, will not commit further crimes and will not intimidate any witnesses in the case.

Question 5

There are two tests to determine whether the accused's conduct constitutes one continuous criminal transaction. First is the single intent test that examines whether the accused's conduct constitutes one continuous criminal transaction, and second is the evidence test that examines whether the evidence necessary to prove one crime involves proving another crime.

Question 6

In Mabuza, the court summarized the standards for judicial officers when questioning witnesses and the accused. The court should not conduct its questioning in a partial manner, take part in the case to such an extent that its vision is clouded, intimidate or upset a witness or the accused, or control the court to the extent that its impartiality, open-mindedness, fairness, and reasonableness are in question.

Question 7

According to Section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court must investigate any delay that appears to be unreasonable and could cause substantial prejudice to the prosecution before the criminal proceeding. The court should consider factors such as the reason for the advanced delay, the duration of the delay, and the effect of the delay on the administration of justice. A long delay does not necessarily infringe on the accused's right to a fair trial. If the court finds the delay unreasonable, it may order the case to be struck from the roll. If the accused is charged again, they must raise a special plea that the trial was stayed by the court's order in terms of Section 342A(3)(c). The court may refuse further postponements of the proceedings under Section 342A(3)(a).